This was the final paper written for my Research Methods in History class earlier this year.
I debated on posting it, but after some consideration, I feel that my position of remaining open for critique would be remiss if I offered nothing for analysis. Having said that, I made every attempt to remain unbiased with this assignment, so if there are any issues with what I wrote, I can only hope that it is due to inaccuracy only and not perceived malice.
The formatting here didn't allow for the footnotes to be carried forward properly, but it's good enough to convey the idea...
Echoes of the Silent Service
Introduction
Submarine museums are scattered all throughout the United States – from Hawaii to New Hampshire. These grey sentinels symbolize the legacy of a time long gone and offer a glimpse of the last remaining artifacts of the efforts and leadership of men and women during some of the most influential events in recent history. Although their battles in times of war have been won, they continue to be involved in another fight – this one against nature, politics, carelessness, and greed. Therefore, preservation of these historic vessels should remain the primary motivation behind the actions and motivation of submarine museum staff.
In Service
The contributions of U.S submarines in the Pacific Theater of Operations during the Second World War epitomized Sun Tzu’s writings and only after the war properly documented and realized. Two hundred, eighty-eight American submarines sank a over five million tons of Japanese merchant shipping and accounted for over 55% of all enemy shipping destroyed within four years . Almost immediately following the surrender of Japan on September 2, 1945, these low grey predators of the Pacific began the long trip back to ports on the East and West coast of the United States for decommissioning and, for some, almost immediate decommissioning and destruction. Other boats, as submarines are referred to, were to be modified for special post war use, but these too were not spared from the shipbreaker’s yards.
Under Title 10, United States Code, Section 7306 , significant vessels may be obtained by 501(c) 3 non-profit organizations in order to promote, commemorate, and safeguard naval heritage and history for future generations. Receiving a donated vessel, however, brings the responsibility for maintaining the ship “in a manner that does not disrespect the veterans that served on these ships or the proud traditions and heritage of the U.S. Navy” . While the organization or individual associated with the operation of a historic ship “assumes title to the vessel and all ownership costs” , the responsibility of improperly displayed or operated ships ultimately rests with the Navy due to the fact that the reasonable standards and expectations understood in the process of applying for and receiving the stewardship of such vessels exist as a framework for not just honor of the past but for the safety of the present and future.
Issues - Financial
By the definition of the Internal Revenue Service, any organization classified as a non-profit must be “organized and operated exclusively for exempt purposes forth in section 501(c)(3), and none of its earnings may inure to any private shareholder or individual” . Misleading as it is, the term non-profit in the case of museum ships fails to capture the realities and necessities for the operation and preservation of these vessels. According to fundraising publications available online, the 2014 dry-docking budget detail for one such museum ship, the USS Pampanito, was estimated to be $500,000 . These costs covered much needed repairs which were impossible to effect as the ship is moored in San Francisco bay and is only able to be dry-docked once every seven years . For ships like the USS Drum, taken out of the corrosive environment of Mobile Bay in 2001 at a cost of $1.4 million , the costs of continuing restoration due to exposure to salt, sediment, and wave action are often out of pocket at times for selfless volunteers or from donations in the form of materials and equipment from local businesses.
Issues - Environmental
Sea-going ships produced during the Second World War were developed long before concerns about the environment and health drove industrial safety practices of today. Asbestos, lead, oil for lubrication and fuel, hydraulic fluids and even radioactive material may be found on the ships not yet deemed suitable for display, and even for the ships open for tours such as the USS Clamagore, the presence of the lead-acid storage batteries poses the requirement for trained personnel and proper facilities for handling and disposal . As Weiner points out the concerns for the USS Ling in New Jersey were not the threat posed to the local environment and resources, but the “protection of staff, volunteers, and the public from these and other harmful materials and substances”.
Issues - Legal
Considerations for the legal aspect of operating and maintaining a museum sub range from the protection of history to the protection of the visitors on board. Guidelines set forth by the Office of the Secretary of the Interior, while not legally binding, are in place “to assist in assist individual vessel owners in formulating plans for management of historic vessels in a manner consistent with the intent of the standards” . However, the laws set forth by the IRS as to the proper reporting and record-keeping for non-profit organizations are more firm in the expectations of conduct. Likewise, the regulatory boundaries established by the Environmental Protection Agency, U.S Coast Guard, as well as the local City and State laws dictate daily operations as well as access to compartments requiring the use of ladders. Insurance coverage for historic access to ships such as the USS Cod, in Cleveland, Ohio may be different for the USS Pampanito in San Francisco, California for example , resulting in entirely different experiences for visitors and logistical planning for staff.
Successes
Location drives the definition of success for three of the museum boats – the USS Cod, USS Pampanito, and the USS Bowfin. With easy access to large metropolitan areas – Cleveland, Ohio, San Francisco, California, and Honolulu, Hawaii, respectively – these museums maintain a steady flow of visitors as well as proximity to organizations and individuals willing to donate time and money towards restoration efforts. In the case of the USS Cod, the relationship with the residents of Cleveland was forged in 1959 when the Navy Reserve relocated the submarine there in order to facilitate the education and training of reservists in the city . Also key to promoting continual nationwide public interest in the USS Cod is the fact that it remains the only museum submarine of its class which has not been altered for visitor ease of access, requiring entry and exit through the original hatches Although altered in this sense, the USS Pampanito received recognition in the 1995 movie Down Periscope , and the preservation, documentation, and promotion of this museum boat showcases the results effective promotion for the cause of preservation. Likewise, the USS Bowfin benefits from being not only within line of sight of the same piers it departed from on wartime patrols, but also within view of the USS Arizona Memorial, and the USS Missouri. These three locations capture the beginning, continuation, and end of the United States’ involvement in the Pacific Theater of Operations during the Second World War. The performance of these three submarine museums therefore could be linked to not just location, but to strong ties within the local community as well as effective promotion and endorsement.
In Peril
It is important to note that location does not always guarantee success for submarine museums. Located in Charleston, South Carolina, the USS Clamagore has fallen into such a state of disrepair due to the negligence of previous leadership that actions were underway as recently as 2013 to scuttle the museum boat in an effort to make an artificial reef . Efforts by veterans in Tennessee to relocate the USS Clamagore to Knoxville , however, offer a glimpse of the dedication of former sailors and other preservation-minded service members and citizens to prevent the loss of one museum boat. Leadership issues also plagued the USS Torsk – the submarine responsible for the last American submarine attack of the war - in Baltimore, Maryland. In April of 2014, a standoff developed between Torsk Volunteer Association - responsible for performing maintenance and repairs on the boat - and the museum staff over paperwork requirements, and differences of opinions. Lastly, the USS Ling, located in Hackensack, New Jersey, suffered damage to the meager museum facility during Hurricane Sandy in 2012 , and as of February 2013, was “financial distress” and threatened by encroaching development with no long-term plans for either relocation or improvement to the existing museum.
Failures
While not an American submarine with the distinction of serving in the Second World War, the fate of the former Soviet submarine, K-77, serves as an ominous reminder of the precarious relationship between weather and these floating museums. In April of 2007, a storm and associated tidal surges flooded the unoccupied submarine through openings made for ease of access , sinking her at her berth. The K-77 was refloated fifteen months after sinking, but according to Carey, there was “no economically reasonable option to pursue other than to dispose of the boat for its scrap salvage value” , and the submarine was scrapped. Another noteworthy failure, the USS Cabot was an aircraft carrier acquired in 1989 and slated for conversion to a museum ship in Kenner, Louisiana , shortly thereafter. Mismanagement and neglect by the owning non-profit organization, the U.S.S. Cabot Dedalo Museum Foundation, Inc., resulted in damage to facilities where the ship was moored, environmental contamination, and a legal battle lasting a decade and resulting in the ship being scrapped . Both of these examples offer possible outcomes for poorly managed and funded museum boats of all types.
Future
One of the bigger considerations for conservation for these museum boats is the fact that most remain afloat and the watertight integrity of these vessels is threatened by corrosion and extremes of weather. Preservation in water is difficult and requires frequent dry-docking in order to clean, inspect, and reapply protective coatings to portions of the hull not accessible when moored in place. An alternative to this frequent preventive maintenance is to beach the submarine on land, much like the USS Batfish and USS Drum, in Mobile, Alabama. While the appeal of visiting a ship still afloat generates interest in visitors and potential donors alike, the increased maintenance costs, vulnerability to extremes of weather, and loss of revenue for times when the central attraction to a submarine museum is inaccessible in a dry-dock is a major consideration for museum boats afloat. Likewise, the perils of weather typically do not effect museums boats on land, they too are subject to the elements and in need of frequent, yet much easier, inspection and repair. Both of these considerations are critical for preserving these vessels for future generations.
An often underrated, yet critical component to the success or failure of a museum is the Operations side of any museum. Typical of job descriptions of the position of “Museum Operations Manager”, East Tennessee University Office of Human Resources lists core values of “people, relationships, diversity, excellence, efficiency, and commitment”. The importance of the Operations function of museum management is emphasized by Boylan in that due to decentralization of these administrative functions, much of the responsibilities of the day to day functions now rest with senior staff and upper management. Regardless of location, with poor operational relevance, presence, and drive, Tannenbaum writes, “these factors can be completely wiped out if a museum-ship organization lacks vision, professionalism, and accepted business and fiscal practices”.
Fundraising, the most important part of operating a non-profit organization, is the life-blood of any museum. Parman writes that, “with public perception at an all-time low, practicing ethical fund raising has never been more important as an organizations' reputation directly relates to donors' trust”. This trust, critical to the viability of these museums, not only generates income for the staff and capital for continued operations, but establishes an identity and a cause for promoting the legacy of the museum as well as potential donors of money, resources, or facilities. Part of the process of fundraising is the financial planning for not just the present, but the future, and as Tannenbaum described, “the wise operations are the ones planning ahead and saving, rather than waiting for issues to reach the crisis state”.
The next generation of volunteers, staff, and donors are currently visiting and watching these precious few museum boats. From the nine year-old showing interest by poising the candid question as to whether or not the submarine will be around for his kids to see, to the student inspired by stories of bravery and determination, to the fourth-generation submariner with a direct connection to these silent relics of a time long past, the preservation of these vessels transcends all present issues. Dawson addresses the schoolchildren of today in stating that “they are far from passive consumers, and unless you allow them to be active in engaging with content, you will lose them”. Engaging the child of today is involving the adult of the future, and for any museum to be successful in the present, the investment is in the future.
It is my opinion, therefore, that “success” and “failure” of submarine museums cannot be readily measured in definitions of present terms. The end goal of these museums is not a “finish line” type goal, nor is it merely measured in a numerical figure of dollars or visitors per year. Instead, the goal is to have the stories, equipment, and vessels outlast the current caretakers much like they have remained long after the men who forged, maintained, and sailed on them into history. It is the responsibility of the museum staff to prevent ego, unethical behavior, and carelessness from compromising the integrity of the stories which are waiting to be told.
Material artifacts will always contest the slow decay which time brings. It is the charge of modern society to prevent or delay this inevitable process to safeguard the links to its past for the educational and cultural benefits for future generations. Therefore, with utmost care and reverence in both action and motivation should these historic vessels be treated submarine museum staff. Once the tangible proof of history is lost, there is no way to get it back.
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It's been a while since I have posted, but schoolwork has consumed a lot of my time. However, I thought I would share the result of what started out as somewhat of a challenge between the Professor and myself. It seems that VADM Lockwood did not immediately come to mind as a candidate for a paper about a "Great Captain" of history, whereas Grand Admiral Dönitz would have been acceptable. Of course, as the saying goes: "Them's fightin' words..." and the result posted below was, in the words of the Professor: "...One of the best original subject papers I have read at APUS in 16 years" and worthy of a grade of 100%.
I would love to post it with all of the appropriate footnotes, but the formatting here won't allow easy replication. Regardless, I hope it provides enjoyable, informational, and accurate reading (if there are inaccuracies, please don't hesitate to point them out)...
Charles A. Lockwood: The Great Captain of the Silent Service
The term “Great Captain” has been used to describe men of the past whom commanded immense groups of men on the land, on the sea, in the air, and into immortal renown. Throughout human history, however, leaders of equal prominence have existed as key individuals responsible for shaping the conflict in which they served and creating a proud legacy to be studied, modeled, and admired for generations. One of these subtle, yet important, figures is Vice Admiral Charles A. Lockwood – Commander, Submarines, Pacific Fleet – during the Second World War, and the man responsible for leading a small portion of the United States Navy in submarine warfare against the entire Imperial Japanese Navy and merchant fleet.
Born May 6, 1890, in Midland, Va., Charles Lockwood’s formative years and early development are noteworthy only for the fact that very little information supports anything other than an unremarkable childhood. The beginnings of his naval career are even contrary indicators as to the type of leader he would later become. Graduating 123rd of 156 from the United States Naval Academy, Lockwood lead only in the number of demerits received - 203. Order of merit in areas such as “efficiency” and “conduct” likewise showed no discernable innate proficiency or skill as he was ranked 115th and 161st, respectively in these areas. However, in 1912 he received his commission and within two years, while assigned to the harbor tug USS Mohician, he received his first exposure and subsequent instruction with the most technologically advanced vessel of the day, the submarine.
Prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7th, 1941, Lockwood broadened his leadership skills in assignments such as Commander, First Submarine Division, Asiatic Fleet, assistant naval attaché in the US Embassy in Tokyo, and witnessed the effects of the attempted naval blockade of Great Britain in the early stages of what would soon become the Second World War while assigned as the U.S. Naval attaché, London, England. A submariner at heart, Lockwood had prior experience with the more advanced German U-boats, and in fact, had commanded the newly captured UC-97 in 1919 through the St. Lawrence Seaway and into the Great Lakes on a publicity drive for Victory Bonds. More importantly, though, this exposure to the potential submarines possessed in waging war across oceans lead a series of recommendations he submitted in 1938. Lockwood sought to increase operating depth to 250 feet, add two aft torpedo tubes, reduce overall diving time to less than 40 seconds, and improve overall crew habitability - all of which foreshadowed operational needs which would turn out to be crucially important three years later.
After 18 years of service, Lockwood was assigned as Commander Submarines Southwest Pacific, based in Albany, Western Australia in May 1942. It was there where he began to understand the importance of maintaining the morale of his submariners as they attempted to maintain what viable defensive and offensive operations against an enemy with substantial logistical, tactical, and numerical advantages. Adding to the multitude of considerations and concerns U.S. forces were faced with, issues with the Mark 14 torpedo – the submarine’s primary weapon – began to become more and more frequent. Reports of misses, premature detonations, and duds prompted Lockwood to begin an informal, yet determined series of tests and official inquiries in mid-1942 and continued as rose to the rank of Rear Admiral and assumed his responsibilities for all U.S. submarines assigned to the Pacific. Upon determining that not only did the torpedoes run deeper than was set prior to firing, the magnetic influence detonators and the mechanical firing pins were defective, Lockwood was quick to disseminate instructions to his command. Along with this, though, Lockwood directly challenged the designer of the weapon, the U.S. Navy Bureau of Ordnance (BuOrd) in defending the submarine commanders against accusations that the fault lie not in the torpedo, but in the inability for the commanders to properly employ the weapon. Characteristic of his ferocity in addressing such bureaucratic pettiness, Lockwood addressed those present at the Submarine Officer’s Conference in Washington D.C. with the biting recommendation to fit the torpedoes with “a boat hook with which we can rip the plates off a target’s side.”
Ongoing struggles to maintain the effectiveness of his fleet did not cease with the identification and rectification of the issues with the torpedoes. Relentless pursuit of the Japanese merchant routes resulted in the need to patrol areas which were accurately suspected to be sown with naval mines. Because of this, Lockwood became very involved in the development, testing, trials, and incorporation of frequency modulated sonar equipment for his fleet. Logistic and support problems which arose due to the long transit distances to and from patrol areas limited the effectiveness of his fleet not just in fuel consumption, but from the natural environmental toll placed on the boats. Seeking to establish submarine-capable bases closer to the shrinking Empire, Lockwood personally scouted possible locations and effectively campaigned to dredging equipment and other construction assets to be diverted accordingly in places like Midway.
Lockwood established himself well as the head of the “Silent Service”, as the submarine forces were called. As a result of his leadership and efforts as the youngest Rear Admiral in the Navy, he was subsequently awarded several Navy Distinguished Service Medals, citing his “sound judgement and professional skill” in establishing operational planning, “tactical execution of submarine operations”, and “unwavering devotion to duty”. His dedication and commitment to the quickest resolution to the war with Japan earned him the highest respect of those whom served with him, and it was because of the contributions of his leadership that Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz appropriately ensured that Lockwood was direct witness to the surrender of the Japanese onboard the USS Missouri. In ensuring that the heroism of the men he led lived on after his retirement in 1947, Lockwood spent the last 13 years of his life writing memoirs, historical accounts of his experiences, and providing his services as technical advisor for some of the most accurate cinematic portrayals of what he knew best – submarines , the men, and their stories.
Determining the leadership style effectively utilized by Lockwood proves to be difficult in that he displayed both “transactional” and “transformational” leadership in an inconsistent, yet extremely effective manner. “Transactional” leadership – that which establishes the internal roles, personal rewards, and desired outcome for those within an organization is best shown in the frequent and ready praise Lockwood publicly extolled of those within his command. Even when faced with problematic engines on their first patrol, Lockwood congratulated the officers and the crew of the Gunnel for a “highly aggressive and successful war patrol”.
“Transformational” leadership exhibited by Lockwood, however, is more evident while being subtle at the same time. Along with the great distances involved between the operating areas of submarines on patrol and Pearl Harbor, operational requirements prohibited frequent radio communications. The empowerment entrusted to his subordinates for relative “freedom to maneuver” in their patrols was only possible with one shared vision and goal – to sink enemy ships. Lockwood strongly personified Taylor’s idea of “creating a mental picture by use of a language from shared experiences”. Lockwood spoke the jargon of his subordinates to the point of engaging in debate with his peers over the use of slang in patrol reports, and was capable of deciphering vital information “between the lines” of official patrol reports and listening to what was discussed off-duty at officer’s clubs. With this information, he was able to comfortably discuss intention, entertain alternatives, and officially endorse subordinates’ recommended proposals; greatly endearing himself and gaining their steadfast loyalty.
Emotional intelligence, a combination of self-awareness, self-regulation, motivation, empathy, and social skills, was best described by Lockwood in a postwar memoir concerning submariners:
“They must be alert without being brittle, . . . interested in their shipmates without being nosy; they must appreciate food without being gluttons; they must respect privacy without being seclusive; they must be talkers without being gabby; and they must be friendly without being tail-waggers. . . . The wrong kind of a man aboard a sub, on a long cruise, can become an insufferable thorn in the sides of shipmates. He can, emotionally, cause almost as much damage as an enemy depth bomb.”
In identifying these characteristics, Lockwood offered a reflection of the exact traits he possessed and led by. Given that there are no absolutes in human behavior, therefore no guarantee as to a solid and singular leadership style which is most effective all the time, emotional intelligence such as what manifested in Lockwood’s leadership, negates any simple attempt at categorization.
Aggression and action were of the utmost importance from America’s entry into the war, and one of the realities Lockwood had to specifically reinforce for his submariners was his inability to accept and condone hesitation and timidity in their conduct of operations. While not initially prepared for the scope of naval warfare required due to prewar deficiencies in training or doctrine, Lockwood had little choice but to relieve those commanders slow to adapt to the needs and challenges before them. Ultimately, Lockwood rose to the challenge set before him of overcoming obstacles and expected those in his command to do likewise, and the transition from peace to war complimented nicely his ascent in the ranks to affect the needed changes.
Part of what distinguishes Lockwood as a great leader from other well-known examples is the fact that he gave his commanders the much needed voice at the time they needed it the most. He was their advocate for their reputation, their promoter of deed, their supplier of comfort and necessity, and their champion of efficiency. He stood behind his men in everything – from construction programs incorporating the operational lessons learned into improved submarine designs, to true “rest and recuperation” in the form of sponsored and informal arrangements for musicians, entertainers, sports figures, and food while not on patrol, to insisting independent operation while at sea – Lockwood favored his men and was obligated to reciprocate their loyalty. This is not to imply that Lockwood was above administering justified reprimand or without error, though. When the USS Queenfish attacked and sunk the Awa Maru – a Japanese hospital ship - on April 1st, 1945, Lockwood was swift in relieving the commander, although he also ensured that the commander retained the best legal defense for the subsequent proceedings.
Always seeking relevance and firsthand experience as to the conditions his men experienced, Lockwood fought unsuccessfully to go out on patrol with his submariners, and while denied, routinely traveled as a passenger on boats transiting between Pearl Harbor and Midway and on these trips could be found sitting on a bucket in a torpedo room, engaged in casual conversation with the torpedomen. Seeking a swift conclusion to the war and resumption of normal life, Lockwood understood the fact that the best way to bring about such a result was to use submarines to bolster the improving morale of his men and impart a strategic and psychological blow to the Japanese by directing his assets to strike shipping in the Sea of Japan. Of course, this was not an attempt to micromanage the efforts of the submariners; other than establishing target priority in 1943, placing carriers, battleships and tankers at the top , Lockwood remained relatively hands off when it came to operational matters – freeing himself up for administrative issues to tackle.
The legacy left behind by Lockwood’s leadership, while understated, is significant. Towards the end of the war, he began to add photographers to the crews to document and commit to history the exploits of his submariners. His contributions to the development and integration of hard-learned lessons of war and his resistance to that what he viewed as “rule-book thinking and hidebound conformity” created a generation of men who followed in his example. Over four decades after the end of the Second World War, the U.S. Navy established the “The Vice Admiral Charles A. Lockwood Award for Submarine Professional Excellence” to recognize individual officers and enlisted personnel for “achievement, contribution, specific action or consistent performance, which best exemplifies the traditional spirit embodied in the Submarine Force.”
Lockwood’s leadership style of the past offers an idea of how to better shape future military leaders and mold the next “great captains” in several ways. By prioritizing the men along with the needs of the mission, he demonstrated a solid grasp that one complimented the other. By establishing a rotational tour of duty which sent commanders ashore after five consecutive patrols, he ensured fewer operational losses and improved the overall welfare of the crews. He also challenged officers to instill aggressiveness and initiative, borrowing the spirit of Brigadier General Lincoln C. Andrews’ philosophy that a leader who is ignorant and/or lazy is, “next to a coward, the most dangerous man”. Similarly, Lockwood’s approach to a unified understanding of the ideas behind training and relevant use of the knowledge imparted from effective doctrine lends credit to Marechal De Saxe’s disdain for apathetic adherence to following “blindly adopted maxims”. Lastly, empathy allowed Lockwood to offer sage guidance when approached for clarification on the extent to which he wished commanders to execute warfare against the enemy by appealing to their own conscience in determining the proper course of action.
Rear Admiral Charles A. Lockwood was a “great captain” in that he possessed high emotional intelligence and empathy as he led the “Silent Service” against the naval combatants and merchant of the Japanese Empire during the Second World War. He has charismatic in the conduct of his duties and the manner in which he contested problems within his own Navy which hampered the performance of his command. Most importantly, though, he was ethical in the application of his own personal strengths and abilities in order to lead effectively and accomplish a mission of the utmost importance to the overall victory in the Pacific. Therefore, regardless of inauspicious beginnings, Charles Lockwood emerged as a prominent leader and key individual responsible for shaping the conflict in which he served and created a proud legacy to be studied, modeled, and admired for generations.
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